A hylomorphic framework has been employed in theology in explaining the Eucharist and the relation of soul and body in man.
1 Here are some further examples of specific questions about hylomorphic relations: (1) The SAMENESS or PRIORITY Question. Is a compound the same as, or identical to, its essence or form?
(Show more) hylomorphism, (from Greek hylē, “matter”; morphē, “form”), in philosophy, metaphysical view according to which every natural body consists of two intrinsic principles, one potential, namely, primary matter, and one actual, namely, substantial form. It was the central doctrine of Aristotle’s philosophy of nature.
Similarly, hylomorphic compounds are neither facts nor states of affairs but just (types of) matter possessing certain structural or ‘shapy’ features. This sort of predicational structure of a hylomorphic compound need not cancel out or reverse the priorities of Aristotle’s ontology. 3. CEM and the Modal Question (M)
The potential principle is matter, the actual principle, form. Phenomenological arguments for hylomorphism have also been proposed. The hylomorphic doctrine was received and variously interpreted by the Greek and Arab commentators of Aristotle and by the Scholastic philosophers.
Opposed to hylomorphism are atomism, mechanism, and dynamism, all of which deny the intrinsic composition of metaphysical principles in bodies and recognize only physical principles, such as corpuscles, pure mathematical extension, or forces and energies.
Empedocles, Greek philosopher, statesman, poet, religious teacher, and physiologist. According to legend only, Empedocles was a self-styled god who brought about his own death, as dramatized by the English poet Matthew Arnold in “Empedocles on Etna,” by flinging himself into the….
Aristotle’s hylomorphism is, roughly speaking, the idea that objects are compounds consisting of matter and form. For example, a statue is a compound of its constituent bronze and its perceptible shape. He argues that hylomorphism can address central metaphysical questions about synchronic and diachronic identity, persistence through change, individuation, the modal profile of objects, and generally the explanation of objects’ nature and characteristic features. There are several innocuous or trivial ways in which to explicate his hylomorphism. Thus, for instance, one might describe it as the view in which (kinds of) objects are characterisable in terms of matter and form; or analysable into matter and form; or understood on the basis of matter and form. Serious problems arise when we seek to specify the sorts of relation holding among the different contributors to the hylomorphic picture. Here are some central general questions:
1 Here are some further examples of specific questions about hylomorphic relations: (1) The SAMENESS or PRIORITY Question. Is a compound the same as, or identical to, its essence or form? Is it the same as, or identical to, the combination of matter plus form? Is a form prior to, and hence non-identical to, a compound? Is it prior to matter? (2) The PART-WHOLE Question. Are form and matter parts of, or do they constitute, the compound? Or are form and matter extrinsically related to the compound, either as completely independent entities or as abstractions in thought from the compound? Another way to raise this question is to ask whether Aristotle’s ontology is constituent–where matter and form are literally constituents of the compound–or whether it is relational–where matter and form bear some extrinsic (neither part-whole nor constituent-constituted) relation to the compound. For this type of discussion see Loux 2014; Lowe 2012. (3) The UNITY Question. Natural substances–whether particulars or their kinds–are paradigmatically one or are exemplary unities. But they also involve many bodily parts. Indeed, they have at least two parts, matter and form, if Aristotle’s ontology follows the literally mereological or constituent approach in dealing with the PART-WHOLE question. How can such pluralities be unities? How are matter and form related to yield a unified compound? Moreover, the form itself, as a definable essence and as the primary object of definition, has at least definitional parts; for, otherwise, it would not be definable ( Metaphysics Z.13, 1039a14–23). But it is also the basic unifier and itself robustly one. How can Aristotle’s theory achieve this sort of unity for a definable, complex form? How are the items making up the form related to constitute a unified form?
For example: objects (or kinds of object) are characterisable in terms of matter and form; or analysable into matter and form; or understood on the basis of matter and form. Serious problems arise when we seek to specify the sorts ...
Especially on the basis of Aristotle’s own artefact examples, it seems plausible to think that (for instance) the matter of a statue, say a piece of bronze, may not be, or may not have been, and perhaps will not be, a/this statue.