Definition of the term 'course of action ' per official documentation of the United States Department of Defense. 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A possible plan open to an individual or commander that would accomplish, or is related to the accomplishment of the mission. 3.
What is military strategy? Military strategy is the practice of reducing an adversary’s physical capacity and willingness to fight, and continuing to do so until one’s aim is achieved. It takes place in wartime and peacetime and may involve using force, directly or indirectly, as a threat.
Maneuver (place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the flexible application of combat power) Unity of Command (For every Objective, ensure Unity of effort under one responsible commander) Security (Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage)
You need to define your strategic course. Knowing what you need to accomplish and defining a precise list of action steps that will lead you to your destination will be your road map to success. This short video highlights some key areas that you need to be aware of. If playback doesn't begin shortly, try restarting your device.
course of action — 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A possible plan open to an individual or commander that would accomplish, or is related to the accomplishment of the mission.
Someone's course of action is what that person is going to do. For example, say you're listening to your friend's vacation plans. Your friend's course of action might be: Take a flight to Paris.
COURSE-OF-ACTION DEVELOPMENT STEPS:ANALYZE RELATIVE COMBAT POWER.ARRAY INITIAL FORCES.DEVELOP THE SCHEME OF MANEUVER.DETERMINE C2 MEANS AND MANEUVER CONTROL MEASURES.PREPARE COURSE-OF-ACTION STATEMENT AND SKETCH.
Select Courses of Action Plans often include multiple courses of action for a given scenario to reflect the different ways it could unfold. After selecting courses of action, the planning team identifies resources necessary to accomplish each course of action without regard to resource availability.
In incident-level decision making, a Course of Action (COA) is an overall plan that describes the selected strategies and management actions intended to achieve Incident Objectives, comply with Incident Requirements, and are based on current and expected conditions.
Selecting the best course of actionCriteria. Selection is done through the application of some form of criteria, which may be consciously or subconsciously selected. ... Negative selection. Remember when you last bought or rented a home. ... Forecasting and risk analysis. ... Positive selection.
The seven-step strategy is:Investigate the situation in detail.Create a constructive environment.Generate good alternatives.Explore your options.Select the best solution.Evaluate your plan.Communicate your decision, and take action.
CoA – course of action.
The criteria of a COA includes the following: Feasibility. A feasible COA can accomplish the mission within the given time, space, and resource limitations. Acceptability.
Military strategies are methods of arranging and maneuvering large bodies of military forces during armed conflicts.
Tactic is usually implemented through surging at the enemy after their attack. Counterforce – A strategy used in nuclear warfare of targeting military infrastructure (as opposed to civilian targets) Countervalue – The opposite of counterforce; targeting of enemy cities and civilian populations.
Scorched earth – Destroying anything that might be of use to the enemy while retreating, or advancing. Turtling – Continuous reinforcement of the military front until it has reached its full strength, then an attack with the now-superior force. Withdrawal – A retreat of forces while maintaining contact with the enemy.
By cutting the enemy columns or units into smaller groups , a mobile force can restrict the mobility of a stronger enemy and defeat it in detail. The name comes from the Finnish word for a cubic meter of firewood, and the strategy was used extensively during the Winter War.
Ends, Ways, Means, Risk – Strategy is much like a three legged stool of ends, ways, means balanced on a plane of varying degree of risk. Enkulette – A strategy used often in the jungle that aims at attacking the enemy from behind. Exhaustion – A strategy that seeks to erode the will or resources of a country.
Air supremacy – A degree of air superiority where a side holds complete control of air power over opposing forces. Control of the air is the aerial equivalent of Command of the sea. Attrition warfare – A strategy of wearing down the enemy to the point of collapse through continuous loss of personnel and material.
Economic concepts. Salaries – Always pay your troops on time. Asymmetric costs – ensure the cost of enemy losses (or objectives) is at least an order of magnitude higher than the costs of attacking. Budget like a business – Ensure there is sufficient funds and revenue streams to finish the war.
DISCUSSION: Wargaming is the most valuable step within the course-of-action analysis. Observations from the CTCs indicate that few staffs understand how to war-game effectively, and that many staff officers are not involved in the procedure. By wargaming , the staff takes a course of action and begins to develop a detailed plan. Additionally, it can better synchronize the course of action when the entire staff is involved in wargaming . Information recorded during the warga me provides the information for the development of paragraph three (execution) of the operations order, the execution or synchronization matrices, and the decision support template. Because of the importance of its results, and the time it requires, more time is allocated than for any other step. Wargaming results in the identification of tasks, combat power requirements, critical events and priority efforts, task organization and command and support relationships, decision points and possible fratricide locations.
The scheme of maneuver is a narrative description of how the forces arrayed will accomplish the commander's intent. Ensure the scheme of maneuver addresses the elements of the battlefield framework (deep operations, covering force/security force, close operations, rear operations, and reserve).
THE DECISION MATRIX WILL HELP THE STAFF RECOMMEND .
The commander, recognizing courses of action that do not adhere to his planning guidance or are not feasible, responds by having the staff do the work again, which wastes time. Or, in the absence of adequate planning time, the commander develops a course of action himself.
However, units are not identified, and task organization is not done at this point. The staff does not assign missions to arrayed units but gains an appreciation for the amount of forces to allocate to accomplish the mission. Once the array is completed, the staff has an idea of the amount of forces required.
In addition to strategic leaders, US military strategists includes theorists and planners who are not only officers and civilians within the Pentagon, but also members of the staffs of the Services, combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, and combat support agencies. 3.
The Nature and Character of Warfare Warfare is, most fundamentally, the use of force to make an enemy to do one’s will. When a party finds itself unable to achieve its goals short of the use of force, it may turn to violence to make its enemy change behavior. a. Warfare’s Constant Nature.
National strategy orchestrates the instruments of national power in support of policy objectives and outlines a broad course of action or guidance statements adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives. The Nature and Character of Warfare .
Strategic thinking requires the ability to foresee continuity of strategic choices with the past and the consequences of their intended or unintentional effects in the future. The strategist is concerned with continuity and change. The strategist extrapolates possible futures from the present situation and then constructs a paradigm of change from which strategic planning seeks to shape a more favorable future. Strategists deal with time horizons in terms of years and not only the immediate future.
Warfare’s Variable Character. A critical job of the strategist is to determine the character of the warfare that might occur. While warfare’s fundamental nature remains constant, its character—what war looks like at any point in time and space—reflects the nature of the societies waging it (see Figure I-1).
Grand strategy exists at a level above those strategies intended to secure particular ends, and above the use of military power alone to achieve strategic objectives. Grand strategy aims to secure and advance a nation’s long-term, enduring, core interests over time.
Warfare is, most fundamentally, the use of force to make an enemy to do one’s will. When a party finds itself unable to achieve its goals short of the use of force, it may turn to violence to make its enemy change behavior.
Crisis action planning is based on actual events. As the crisis unfolds, assumptions and projections are replaced by facts and actual conditions. Deliberate planning supports crisis action planing by anticipating potential crises and developing joint operations plans that facilitate rapid development and selection of a course of action. If the actual crisis conditions closely match the assumptions in a deliberate plan then the decision making cycle of CAP can be accelerated. CAP is often conducted in a time-sensitive environment so the process is intentionally flexible and is normally focused on single operations. The procedures provide for the timely flow of information and intelligence; rapid communication of decisions from the President and SECDEF to combatant commanders, subordinate JTF, and component commanders; and expeditious execution planning. CAP places a premium on efficient commander and staff planning dynamics and on concurrent planning between multiple levels of command. At the unified and sub-unified command level, CAP is normally conducted by the J3, Operations Directorate. (CJCSI 3122.01)
Within the campaign decision-making process, the combatant commander determines the organization and command relationships after assigning tasks to subordinates. The establishment of command relationships includes determining the types of subordinate commands and the degree of authority to be delegated to each. Clear definition of command relationships further clarifies the intent of the combatant commander and contributes to decentralized execution and unity of effort. The combatant commander has the authority to determine the types of subordinate commands from several doctrinal options, including Service components, functional commands, and subordinate joint commands. The options for delegating authority emanate from COCOM and range from OPCON to support.
The theater and supporting operational objectives assigned to subordinates are critical elements of the theater-strategic design of the campaign. They establish the conditions necessary to reach the desired end state and achieve the national strategic objectives. The combatant commander focuses on national military or multinational objectives to select theater strategic and supporting operational objectives. Subordinate JFCs or components, in turn, are assigned specific theater strategic and supporting operational objectives for subordinate campaigns. The combatant commander carefully defines the objectives to ensure clarity of theater and operational intent and to identify specific tasks required to achieve those objectives.
A COA is any course of action open to a commander that, if adopted, would result in the accomplishment of the mission of the campaign. For each COA, the commander must envision the employment of own/friendly forces and assets as a whole, taking into account externally imposed limitations, the factual situation in the area of operations, and the conclusions previously drawn up during the mission analysis and previous steps of the commander’s guidance.
The combatant commander’s requirements must be the principal driver of the intelligence system. Based upon the combatant commanders guidance, Essential Elements of Information (EEI) are prepared and Requests for Information (RFI) submitted. The J2 can then focus the intelligence effort to collecting, processing, producing and disseminating the required intelligence (See Joint Publication 2-0). While EEI can be derived from many sources, the estimate process can offer aspects of assumptions, enemy capabilities, geostrategic factors, etc. that need to be clarified by the intelligence system.
Theater campaign plans implement national strategic direction and ensure the integration and support of the application of the elements of national power in a crisis. Since the theater commander must employ the forces assigned or allocated to the command, he must provide those forces with strategic direction and operational focus to achieve the military end state in support of the strategic end state for any given crisis. The most comprehensive direction is contained in a theater campaign plan. A theater campaign can be designed for a crisis in peacetime, conflict or war.
Campaign planning has been a technique used by famous commanders to synchronize efforts and to sequence several related operations. George Washington planned his campaign of 1781 to coordinate the actions of the French Fleet with his Franco-American land army to destroy the British forces at Yorktown. General U. S. Grant planned simultaneous offensives by Generals Sherman and Meade among others against the Confederacy as his plan for the 1864 campaign. During World War II, campaign planning became essential to coordinate the actions of joint and combined forces in all Allied theaters. As a mature example of campaign planning in the later stages of World War II in the Pacific Theater of War, General Douglas MacArthur issued his Strategic Plan for Operations in the Japanese Archipelago (DOWNFALL) in May 1945. In this twenty-five page document, MacArthur describes how ”This Plan of campaign visualizes attainment of the assigned objectives by two (2) successive operations (OLYMPIC and CORONET).” The cover letter describes this plan as a “general guide covering the larger phases of allocation of means and of coordination, both operational and logistic. It is not designed to restrict executing agencies in detailed development of their final plans of operation.” Unfortunately, during the 1960s and 1970s, campaign planning became virtually replaced at the theater level by the DOD-directed, computer-supported Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) which emphasized deployment planning. Campaign planning received new emphasis after Operation DESERT STORM in which General Norman Schwartzkopf used a campaign plan to guide the synchronized employment of his forces.