Aug 11, 2020 · View Liberty University RLGN 104 test 8 Complete solution.docx from RLGN 104 at Liberty University. Liberty University RLGN 104 test 8 Complete solution 100%
Nov 17, 2019 · View Notes - DB4.docx from APOL 620 at Liberty University. What 2–3 replies to William Rowe’s evidential argument from evil do you think are the most helpful and most compelling? Do you think that
Apr 05, 2018 · View Test Prep - quiz 8.docx from RELIGION 104 at Liberty University. Question 1 3.5 out of 3.5 points Evidential Apologists, use which of …
Oct 03, 2021 · Argument for Theism Name: Ryan Duarte This assignment (1) analyses arguments for God's existence from both theistic and non-theistic perspectives, and (2) considers and provides responses to the logical or evidential Problem of Evil. Part 1: Best Argument for Theism. In a 125-150-word response for each of the following prompts, be sure to use your own words …
To summarize, the evidential argument from evil relies on the atheist being able to prove that it is very unlikely there are “good reasons that justify serious evils.". But human beings are not in a good epistemic (or knowledge-gaining) position to know those reasons do not exist.
Some of these are called natural evils, and they include things not caused by humans, such as hurricanes and cancer, that kill millions of creatures every year. Rowe provides one specific example of such a natural evil: "In some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire.
Trent Horn holds a Master’s degree in Theology from the Franciscan University of Steubenville and is currently an apologist and speaker for Catholic Answers. He specializes in training pro-lifers to intelligently and compassionately engage pro-choice advocates in genuine dialogue. He recently released his first book, titled Answering Atheism: How to Make the Case for God with Logic and Charity. Follow Trent at his blog, TrentHorn.com.
Evidentialism is the thesis that all reasons to believe p are evidence for p . Pragmatists hold that pragmatic considerations—incentives for believing—can also be reasons to believe. Nishi Shah, Thomas Kelly and others have argued for evidentialism on the grounds that incentives for belief fail a ‘reasoning constraint’ on reasons: roughly, reasons must be considerations we can reason from, but we cannot reason from incentives to belief. In the first half of the paper, I show that this argument fails: the claim that we cannot reason from incentives is either false or does not combine with the reasoning constraint to support evidentialism. However, the failure of this argument suggests an alternative route to evidentialism. Roughly, reasons must be premises of good reasoning, but it is not good reasoning to reason from incentives to belief. The second half of the paper develops and defends this argument for evidentialism.
Evidentialism is the thesis that all reasons to believe p are evidence for p. Evidentialism implies that incentives for believing p are not, thereby, reasons to believe p. For instance, evidentialism implies that the fact that believing in God would make you happy is not, thereby, a reason to believe that God exists.
The core idea behind the GRC is the same simple thought which motivated RC. Reasons are supposed to guide us and the way in which reasons guide us is through reasoning. On a natural understanding, this thought supports GRC more directly than it supports RC. The basic thought is normative: reasons are what should guide us, and so there must be a good route from our reasons to the responses they support. Reasons must be premises of good reasoning.
The argument from reasoning promised to establish evidentialism on the basis of an uncontroversial psychological claim. This argument fails but in a way that suggests an alternative route to the same conclusion. Incentives for belief are not reasons to believe because they are not premises of good reasoning to belief. This argument lacks the ‘knock-down’ force promised by the argument from reasoning; it requires a normative premise, which the committed pragmatist may reject. 22 However, insofar as the dispute between evidentialists and pragmatists is a normative one, it should not ultimately be surprising that it must be decided on normative grounds. And as I have tried to bring out, the normative premise my argument requires is made plausible by reflections on the nature of reasoning which do not presuppose evidentialism. So this argument should at least be able to move the uncommitted. More generally, I hope that the discussion here has highlighted the importance of the connection between reasons and good reasoning—a connection, I have argued, that those who accept the more familiar connection between reasons and our capacities to reason are committed to. I believe that this connection has an important role to play in several other debates about reasons. 23 But exploring these implications is a task for another time. 24
Compare: although there are aest hetically good toasters, there is no such thing as being aesthetically good as a toaster. (There's such a thing as being aesthetically good for a toaster; but that is just to be aesthetically good by comparison with other toasters). 19. Two clarificatory points.
The evidential version of the problem of evil (also referred to as the probabilistic or inductive version), seeks to show that the existence of evil, although logically consistent with the existence of God, counts against or lowers the probability of the truth of theism.
Originating with Greek philosopher Epicurus, the logical argument from evil is as follows: If an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent god exists, then evil does not. There is evil in the world. Therefore, an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God does not exist. This argument is of the form modus tollens, and ...
If God lacks any one of these qualities—omniscience, omnipotence, or omnibenevolence—then the logical problem of evil can be resolved. Process theology and open theism are other positions that limit God’s omnipotence and/or omniscience (as defined in traditional theology). Dystheism is the belief that God is not wholly good.
Evil exists (logical contradiction). Both of these arguments are understood to be presenting two forms of the logical problem of evil. They attempt to show that the assumed propositions lead to a logical contradiction and therefore cannot all be correct.
Gratuitous evils exist. The hypothesis of indifference, i.e., that if there are supernatural beings they are indifferent to gratuitous evils, is a better explanation for (1) than theism. Therefore, evidence prefers that no god, as commonly understood by theists, exists.
The problem of evil has also been extended beyond human suffering, to include suffering of animals from cruelty, disease and evil. One version of this problem includes animal suffering from natural evil, such as the violence and fear faced by animals from predators, natural disasters, over the history of evolution. This is also referred to the Darwinian problem of evil, after Charles Darwin who expressed it as follows:
God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. An omnibenevolent being would want to prevent all evils. An omniscient being knows every way in which evils can come into existence, and knows every way in which those evils could be prevented. An omnipotent being has the power to prevent that evil from coming into existence.
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