Nov 29, 2019 · View Test Prep - Quiz 7.docx from PHIL 201 P 1 at Liberty University. Question 1 3 out of 3 points The evidential problem of evil attempts to show which of the
Question 18 3 / 3 pts The evidential problem of evil attempts to show which of the following? The co-existence of God and evil is impossible. The co-existence of God and evil is improbable. The co-existence of God and evil is possible. The co-existence of God and evil is highly likely.
Jun 26, 2019 · Question 22 3 out of 3 points As a response to the evidential problem of evil, ... Question 25 3 out of 3 points The logical problem of evil attempts to show which of the following? Selected Answer: The co-existence of God and evil is impossible. ... Course Hero is not sponsored or endorsed by any college or university. ...
The evidential problem of evil attempts to show which of the following? Selected Answer: The co-existence of God and evil is improbable. Question 2. 3 out of 3 points. The problem of divine hiding is only a problem for nonbelievers. Selected Answer: Fal se Question 3. 3 out of 3 points. God never hides. Selected Answer: Fal se Question 4. 3 out of 3 points
The evidential problem of evil is the problem of determining whether and, if so, to what extent the existence of evil (or certain instances, kinds, quantities, or distributions of evil) constitutes evidence against the existence of God, that is to say, a being perfect in power, knowledge and goodness.
Which of the following are reasons God might hide, even from believers for a time? Answer: God uses times of hiddenness to deepen and stabilize our faith.
The evidential problem of evil (also referred to as the probabilistic or inductive version of the problem) seeks to show that the existence of evil, although logically consistent with the existence of God, counts against or lowers the probability of the truth of theism.
The problem with that premise, as we saw, is that it can be argued that some evils are such that their actuality, or at least their possibility, is logically necessary for goods that outweigh them, in which case it is not true that a perfectly good being would want to eliminate such evils.Sep 16, 2002
Thomas Aquinas, the 13th-century Dominican theologian, and in the Theodicy (1710), by the German philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. According to Leibniz, there are three forms of evil in the world: moral, physical, and metaphysical.
Conclusion: "The universe has a cause." Given that the Kalam cosmological argument is a deductive argument, if both premises are true, the truth of the conclusion follows necessarily.
The problem of evil is often formulated in two forms: the logical problem of evil and the evidential problem of evil.
William Leonard Rowe (/roʊ/ July 26, 1931 – August 22, 2015) was a professor of philosophy at Purdue University who specialized in the philosophy of religion. His work played a leading role in the "remarkable revival of analytic philosophy of religion since the 1970s".
William L. Rowe (1931- ) argues that it's all well and good to show that it's logically possible that God is all-loving, all-knowing, all-powerful, and yet there is evil; however, it's quite another thing to show that that's actually the case.
FACTFILE: GCSE RELIGIOUS STUDIES: THE PROBLEM OF EVIL Christians look to Jesus' own suffering and accept that suffering on earth cannot be overcome and may be part of God's plan that they simply have to accept. Prayer and reading the Bible can help some Christians cope with suffering.
God if he exists, is omnipotent and all-good. evil things happen. if God were to exist, he would not allow them to happen, at least not to the degree that they do.
The evidential problem of evil is the problem of determining whether and, if so, to what extent the existence of evil (or certain instances, kinds, quantities, or distributions of evil) constitutes evidence against the existence of God, that is to say, a being perfect in power, knowledge and goodness.
The problem of evil may be described as the problem of reconciling belief in God with the existence of evil. But the problem of evil, like evil itself, has many faces. It may, for example, be expressed either as an experiential problem or as a theoretical problem. In the former case, the problem is the difficulty of adopting or maintaining an attitude of love and trust toward God when confronted by evil that is deeply perplexing and disturbing. Alvin Plantinga (1977: 63-64) provides an eloquent account of this problem:
In an influential paper entitled, “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Evil,” Stephen Wykstra raised a formidable objection to Rowe’s inference from P to Q. Wykstra’s first step was to draw attention to the following epistemic principle, which he dubbed “CORNEA” (short for “Condition Of ReasoNable Epistemic Access”):
The predominant conception of God within the western world, and hence the kind of deity that is normally the subject of debate in discussions on the problem of evil in most western philosophical circles, is the God of “orthodox theism.” According to orthodox theism, there exists just one God, this God being a person or person-like. The operative notion, however, behind this form of theism is that God is perfect, where to be perfect is to be the greatest being possible or, to borrow Anselm’s well-known phrase, the being than which none greater can be conceived. (Such a conception of God forms the starting-point in what has come to be known as “perfect being theology”; see Morris 1987, 1991, and Rogers 2000). On this view, God, as an absolutely perfect being, must possess the following perfections or great-making qualities:
In the present work, therefore, a natural evil will be defined as an evil resulting solely or chiefly from the operation of the laws of nature. Alternatively, and perhaps more precisely, an evil will be deemed a natural evil only if no non-divine agent can be held morally responsible for its occurrence.
Criticisms of Rowe’s argument tend to focus on its first premise, sometimes dubbed “the factual premise,” as it purports to state a fact about the world. Briefly put, the fact in question is that there exist instances of intense suffering which are gratuitous or pointless. As indicated above, an instance of suffering is gratuitous, according to Rowe, if an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented it without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. A gratuitous evil, in this sense, is a state of affairs that is not (logically) necessary to the attainment of a greater good or to the prevention of an evil at least as bad.
At least one question to be addressed when considering this inference is: What exactly do P and Q assert? Beginning with P, the central notion here is “a good state of affairs we know of.” But what is it to know of a good state of affairs? According to Rowe (1988: 123), to know of a good state of affairs is to (a) conceive of that state of affairs, and (b) recognize that it is intrinsically good (examples of states that are intrinsically good include pleasure, happiness, love, and the exercise of virtue). Rowe (1996: 264) therefore instructs us to not limit the set of goods we know of to goods that we know have occurred in the past or to goods that we know will occur in the future. The set of goods we know of must also include goods that we have some grasp of, even if we do not know whether they have occurred or ever will occur. For example, such a good, in the case of Sue, may consist of the experience of eternal bliss in the hereafter. Even though we lack a clear grasp of what this good involves, and even though we cannot be sure that such a good will ever obtain, we do well to include this good amongst the goods we know of. A good that we know of, however, cannot justify God in permitting E1 or E2 unless that good is actualized at some time.
The evidential version of the problem of evil (also referred to as the probabilistic or inductive version), seeks to show that the existence of evil, although logically consistent with the existence of God, counts against or lowers the probability of the truth of theism.
Originating with Greek philosopher Epicurus, the logical argument from evil is as follows: If an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent god exists, then evil does not. There is evil in the world. Therefore, an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God does not exist. This argument is of the form modus tollens, and ...
If God lacks any one of these qualities—omniscience, omnipotence, or omnibenevolence—then the logical problem of evil can be resolved. Process theology and open theism are other positions that limit God’s omnipotence and/or omniscience (as defined in traditional theology). Dystheism is the belief that God is not wholly good.
Evil exists (logical contradiction). Both of these arguments are understood to be presenting two forms of the logical problem of evil. They attempt to show that the assumed propositions lead to a logical contradiction and therefore cannot all be correct.
Gratuitous evils exist. The hypothesis of indifference, i.e., that if there are supernatural beings they are indifferent to gratuitous evils, is a better explanation for (1) than theism. Therefore, evidence prefers that no god, as commonly understood by theists, exists.
The problem of evil has also been extended beyond human suffering, to include suffering of animals from cruelty, disease and evil. One version of this problem includes animal suffering from natural evil, such as the violence and fear faced by animals from predators, natural disasters, over the history of evolution. This is also referred to the Darwinian problem of evil, after Charles Darwin who expressed it as follows:
God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. An omnibenevolent being would want to prevent all evils. An omniscient being knows every way in which evils can come into existence, and knows every way in which those evils could be prevented. An omnipotent being has the power to prevent that evil from coming into existence.