Second Objection To Behaviorism Second not every mental state can be understood from PHIL 1 at DeAnza College
Feb 16, 2021 · His obvious objection to it is the point fact that a person can feel one way and behave another. There something more than just behavior. Thus, Armstrong searched for a more refined this theory through what he called dispositional behaviorism A better version of behaviorism is provided by Gilbert Ryle's Dispositional Theory.
Armstrong Objection to Dispositional Behaviorism Objection to Dispositional. Armstrong objection to dispositional behaviorism. School University of Illinois, Urbana Champaign; Course Title ECE 220; Uploaded By Billybob2343423. Pages 114 This preview shows page 108 - …
Ironically, Ryle’s other main argument against dualism — that it can make no sense of causation of behavior by mental states — can also be turned into an argument against behaviorism. As we discussed in connection with dualism, we often make claims about mental states causing actions — as in the claim that I walked down the hall because I desired some coffee. But can explanations like this be squared with the idea that mental states are clusters of behavior, or dispositions to certain kinds of behavior? Compare this explanation: the glass broke when it hit the ground because it is prone to break when its hits a hard surface. This does provide some information; but does it seem like the same kind of explanation as the explanation of behavior by mental states?
Putnam notes that different behaviorists hold different views, but that the essence of the view is that, in some sense, mental states are nothing over and above clusters of behavior, or clusters of dispositions to behavior. (Remember Ryle’s idea that Cartesianism is a category mistake; that fits well with Putnam’s characterization.)
This gives us a way to test the truth of behaviorism. If behaviorism is true about mental states in general, then there should be some necessary connection of the form: 1. John is in pain. John engages in such-and-such behavior. (where what ‘such-and-such behavior’ is is identified by the theory).
But the connection between them is only contingent. It is surely possible for the first to be true but the second false.
Now, Ryle is certainly right that dualist views about knowledge of other minds can sound odd. But Ryle’s own view also seems to run into problems about knowledge of mental states. But the problems that it generates are not about knowledge of the mental states of others, but rather about knowledge of one’s own mental states.