war cannot be overwhelmingly high. By that we mean that there must be some plausible situations in the eyes of the decision makers such that the anticipated gains from a war in terms of resources, power, glory, territory, and so forth exceed the expected costs of conflict, including expected damages to property and life. Thus, for war to occur with
War is the intentional use of mass force to resolve disputes over governance. War is, indeed, governance by bludgeon. Ultimately, war is profoundly anthropological: it is about which group of people gets to say what goes on in a given territory. War is a brutal and ugly enterprise.
This course examines classic approaches to war as an intellectual problem, looking at how a matter of such great physical violence and passions can be subjected to understanding and used in philosophy, history, political theory, and art. The questions to be examined will include the definition of war, its causes, its moral value (or lack thereof), the nature and identities of its …
Of course, arguments of the second sort may and often do presume rational behavior by individual leaders; that is, war may be rational for civilian or military leaders if they will enjoy various benefits of war without suffering costs imposed on the population.
Most branches of the tradition have had some version of a “legitimate”, “proper” or “right” authority constraint, construed as a necessary condition for a war to be ad bellum just. [ 12] In practice, this means that sovereigns and states have rights that non-state actors lack. International law gives only states rights of national defence and bestows “combatant rights” primarily on the soldiers of states. Although Walzer said little about legitimate authority, his arguments all assume that states have a special moral standing that non-state actors lack.
Contemporary just war theory is dominated by two camps: traditionalist and revisionist. [ 3] . The traditionalists might as readily be called legalists. Their views on the morality of war are substantially led by international law, especially the law of armed conflict.
Traditional just war theory construes jus ad bellum and jus in bello as sets of principles, satisfying which is necessary and sufficient for a war’s being permissible. Jus ad bellum typically comprises the following six principles: 1 Just Cause: the war is an attempt to avert the right kind of injury. 2 Legitimate Authority: the war is fought by an entity that has the authority to fight such wars. 3 Right Intention: that entity intends to achieve the just cause, rather than using it as an excuse to achieve some wrongful end. 4 Reasonable Prospects of Success: the war is sufficiently likely to achieve its aims. 5 Proportionality: the morally weighted goods achieved by the war outweigh the morally weighted bads that it will cause. 6 Last Resort (Necessity): there is no other less harmful way to achieve the just cause.
In particular, we should prescribe morally justified laws of war. We then tell individuals and groups that they ought to follow those laws. On the second approach, we should focus first on the moral reasons that apply directly to individual and group actions, without the mediating factor of institutions. We tell individuals and groups to act as their moral reasons dictate. Since this approach focuses not on the institutions that govern our interactions, but on those interactions themselves , we will call it the “interactional” approach. [ 6]
The second divide is related to the first. Reductivists think that killing in war must be justified by the same properties that justify killing outside of war. Non-reductivists, sometimes called exceptionalists, think that some properties justify killing in war that do not justify killing outside of war. [ 7] .
Traditional just war theory construes jus ad bellum and jus in bello as sets of principles, satisfying which is necessary and sufficient for a war’s being permissible . Jus ad bellum typically comprises the following six principles: Just Cause: the war is an attempt to avert the right kind of injury.
The central task of the proportionality constraint, recall, is to identify reasons that tell in favour of fighting and those that tell against it. Much of the latter task is reserved for the discussion of jus in bello below, since it concerns weighing lives in war.
Just war theory is probably the most influential perspective on the ethics of war and peace. The just war tradition has enjoyed a long and distinguished pedigree, including such notables as Augustine, Aquinas, Grotius, Suarez, Vattel and Vitoria. Hugo Grotius is probably the most comprehensive and formidable classical member of the tradition; James T. Johnson is the authoritative historian of this tradition; and many recognize Michael Walzer as the dean of contemporary just war theorists. Many credit Augustine with the founding of just war theory but this is incomplete. As Johnson notes, in its origins just war theory is a synthesis of classical Greco-Roman, as well as Christian, values. If we have to “name names”, the founders of just war theory are probably the triad of Aristotle, Cicero and Augustine. Many of the rules developed by the just war tradition have since been codified into contemporary international laws governing armed conflict, such as The United Nations Charter and The Hague and Geneva Conventions. The tradition has thus been doubly influential, dominating both moral and legal discourse surrounding war. It sets the tone, and the parameters, for the great debate.
This discourse is dominated by three major traditions of thought: just war theory (and its international law subsidiary); realism ; and pacifism. The interaction between these three traditions structures the contemporary discussion of wartime issues, at the same time as it fuels fascinating debate about them. While just war theory occupies an especially large and influential space within the discourse, its realist and pacifist alternatives endure as provocative challenges to the philosophical mainstream which it represents.
The rules of jus ad bellum are addressed, first and foremost, to heads of state. Since political leaders are the ones who inaugurate wars, setting their armed forces in motion, they are to be held accountable to jus ad bellum principles. If they fail in that responsibility, then they commit war crimes. In the language of the Nuremberg prosecutors, aggressive leaders who launch unjust wars commit “crimes against peace.” What constitutes a just or unjust resort to armed force is disclosed to us by the rules of jus ad bellum. Just war theory contends that, for any resort to war to be justified, a political community, or state, must fulfil each and every one of the following six requirements:
Jus in bello refers to justice in war, to right conduct in the midst of battle. Responsibility for state adherence to jus in bello norms falls primarily on the shoulders of those military commanders, officers and soldiers who formulate and execute the war policy of a particular state. They are to be held responsible for any breach of the principles which follow below. Such accountability may involve being put on trial for war crimes, whether by one's own national military justice system or perhaps by the newly-formed International Criminal Court (created by the 1998 Treaty of Rome).
Jus post bellum refers to justice during the third and final stage of war: that of war termination . It seeks to regulate the ending of wars, and to ease the transition from war back to peace. There is little international law here—save occupation law and perhaps the human rights treaties—and so we must turn to the moral resources of just war theory. But even here the theory has not dealt with jus post bellum to the degree it should. There is a newness, unsettledness and controversy attaching to this important topic. To focus our thoughts, consider the following proposed principles for jus post bellum:
It seems best to rely on Jenny Teichman's definition of pacifism as “anti-war-ism.” Literally and straightforwardly, a pacifist rejects war in favour of peace. It is not violence in all its forms that the most challenging kind of pacifist objects to; rather, it is the specific kind and degree of violence that war involves which the pacifist objects to. A pacifist objects to killing (not just violence) in general and, in particular, she objects to the mass killing, for political reasons, which is part and parcel of the wartime experience. So, a pacifist rejects war ; she believes that there are no moral grounds which can justify resorting to war. War, for the pacifist, is always wrong.
Realism is most influential amongst political scientists, as well as scholars and practitioners of international relations. While realism is a complex and often sophisticated doctrine, its core propositions express a strong suspicion about applying moral concepts, like justice, to the conduct of international affairs. Realists believe that moral concepts should be employed neither as descriptions of, nor as prescriptions for, state behaviour on the international plane. Realists emphasize power and security issues, the need for a state to maximize its expected self-interest and, above all, their view of the international arena as a kind of anarchy, in which the will to power enjoys primacy.
Mark Edward Lewis received his B.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Chicago and studied Chinese at the International Chinese Language Program. His research deals with many aspects of Chinese civilization in the late pre-imperial, early imperial, and middle periods, and with the problem of empire as a political and social form.
Mark Edward Lewis received his B.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Chicago and studied Chinese at the International Chinese Language Program. His research deals with many aspects of Chinese civilization in the late pre-imperial, early imperial, and middle periods, and with the problem of empire as a political and social form.
The central puzzle about war, and also the main reason we study it, is that wars are costly but nonetheless wars recur. Scholars have attempted to resolve the puzzle with three types of argument. First, one can argue that people (and state leaders in particular) are sometimes or always irrational.
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In his essay " Most wars are not fought for reasons of security or material interests, but instead reflect a nation's spirit ," he writes: " [Literature on war and its causes] assumes security is the principal motive of states and insecurity the major cause of war.
1. Economic Gain. Often wars are caused by one country's wish to take control of another country's wealth. Whatever the other reasons for a war may be, there is almost always an economic motive underlying most conflicts, even if the stated aim of the war is presented to the public as something more noble.
A war is typically fought by a country or group of countries against an opposing country or group with the aim of achieving an objective through the use of force. Wars can also be fought within a country in the form of a civil or revolutionary war. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, "war" is defined as.
A state of armed conflict between different countries or different groups within a country. A state of competition or hostility between different people or groups. A sustained campaign against an undesirable situation or activity. Wars have been a part of human history for thousands of years, and have become increasingly destructive as ...
In the modern world, where military aggression is more widely questioned, countries will often argue that they are fighting in a purely defensive capacity against an aggressor, or potential aggressor, and that their war is therefore a “just” war.
Adolf Hitler went to war with Russia partly because the Russians (and eastern Europeans in general) were seen as Slavs, or a group of people who the Nazis believed to be an inferior race.
Finnish-Soviet War or "The Winter War" (1939-1940) – Stalin and his Soviet Army wanted to mine Nickel and Finland, but when the Finnish refused, the Soviet Union waged war on the country. pinterest-pin-it. A strategic map of central Europe from 1917. National Museum of the U.S. Airforce.