Both opponents and proponents agree that trade was much in our national consciousness, in our domestic politics, in our economic performance and in our diplomatic relations. Many of the major trade achievements of the 1990s will leave their mark for years to come.
Although critics allege that the congressional trade consensus eroded during the 1990s, it is worth noting that the singular accomplishment of this so-called consensus during the 1980s was the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act, whose provisions were more notable in the area of fair trade than that of trade opening.
In international economics, the big event of the 1990s was the decline of Japan and the associated “Asian model” of capitalism.
The 1990s opened with the US in a defensive crouch on competitiveness and a broad political consensus that the US needed to be more aggressive in promoting its commercial interests.
Trade was important in the 1990s. Both opponents and proponents agree that trade was much in our national consciousness, in our domestic politics, in our economic performance and in our diplomatic relations. Many of the major trade achievements of the 1990s will leave their mark for years to come.
The course of trade policy over the 1990s was integrally shaped by the interaction with the overall state of the economy —as it had been, in mirror image, during the 1980s. When the Clinton administration entered office in 1993, the overriding imperative was the “economy, stupid.” America’s economic posture abroad was overwhelmingly colored by the realities of the 1980s: severe macroeconomic imbalance associated with loose fiscal policy and tight monetary policy and severe erosion of international market share and “competitiveness” in key manufacturing sectors. Japan was seen as the major competitive threat to be challenged where possible and imitated where not. In fact, one of the main points of agreement among the Clinton administration’s new economic team coming into office was that with the Cold War over, American policymakers could take off their gloves vis-a-vis Japan.
The terms of China’s entry into the WTO will have a profound impact on US-China relations, on the terms of China’s integration into the international economy, and on the WTO itself for years to come. On the other hand, several interactions between trade and foreign policy are worth noting.
And it put the US in a position to act as a stable anchor in the international financial system, first in the Mexican peso crisis of 1995 and later in the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8, helping to support accelerated recoveries and to maintain the commitment to open trade regimes.
By the end of the 1990s, America had compiled one of the most impressive records seen in decades on forging trade agreements with key regional and bilateral partners and providing leadership on the multilateral trading system, with profound implications for economic and foreign policy.
Japan was seen as the major competitive threat to be challenged where possible and imitated where not. In fact, one of the main points of agreement among the Clinton administration’s new economic team coming into office was that with the Cold War over, American policymakers could take off their gloves vis-a-vis Japan.
Although critics allege that the congressional trade consensus eroded during the 1990s, it is worth noting that the singular accomplishment of this so-called consensus during the 1980s was the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act, whose provisions were more notable in the area of fair trade than that of trade opening.