which of the following is the explanandum? course hero

What is an explanandum?

An explanandum (a Latin term) is a sentence describing a phenomenon that is to be explained, and the explanans are the sentences adduced as explanations of that phenomenon.

What is an explanandum in social science?

In the social sciences. Jon Elster wrote: "I argue that all explanation is causal. To explain a phenomenon (an explanandum) is to cite an earlier phenomenon (the explanans) that caused it.".

What is the crucial comment about the scientific method?

The crucial comment, with respect to the scientific method, is given as follows: "It may be said... that an explanation is not fully adequate unless its explanans, if taken account of in time, could have served as a basis for predicting the phenomenon under consideration .... It is this potential predictive force which gives scientific explanation ...

Who made the distinction between explanans and explanandum?

In scientific method. Carl Gustav Hempel and Paul Oppenheim (1948), in their deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation, motivated the distinction between explanans and explanandum in order to answer why-questions, rather than simply what-questions:

Who proposed the pattern of relationships among organisms?

Philosopher of science Ronald Brady proposed that the pattern of relationships among organisms represents an explanandum that is prior to and independent of its explanation (explanans), the theory of evolution. This is an expression of the pattern cladistic viewpoint.

What does "capable" mean?

capable, at least in principle, of test by experiment or observation."

What is the difference between an initial condition and an observation?

Initial Conditions and General Laws are the Explanans. Observation is the Explanandum. More generally, this is one type of "covering law" explanation. The other type is "inductive-statistical" explanation, where the law is

Which two logical structures have identical logical structures?

According to this view, prediction and explanation have an identical logical structure.

Is the notion of causation problematic?

1. The notion of causation is at least as problematic

Does this meet Hempel's conditions of adequacy?

Does this meet Hempel's conditions of adequacy? no

Do they rule out non-explanatory cases?

they don't rule out some non-explanatory cases)

What is the most important theory of scientific explanation?

The most influential theory of scientific explanation today, first proposed by Carl Gustav Hempel and Paul Oppenheim in 1948 [ Hempel and Oppenheim 1948; Hempel, 1965 ], is known as the “covering-law model.” Roughly, it says that a scientific explanation is a logical argument whose premises comprise a set of statements that include one or more scientific laws and whose conclusion is a statement that describes the explanandum, i.e. the phenomenon, fact or event to be explained. The premises are called the explanans because they explain the explanandum. In addition to laws the explanans also contains some other statements describing those particular circumstances, called antecedent conditions, which made the occurrence of explanandum possible.

What is Hempel's scientific explanation?

Hempel [1965] regards scientific explanation as a matter of subsuming an explanandum E under a law L , so that E can be derived from L in conjunction with particular facts. He also recognizes a distinctive kind of “inductive-statistical” (IS) explanation, in which E is subsumed under a statistical law, which will take the form of a statement of conditional probability; in this case, E cannot be validly derived from the law and particular facts, but rather is rendered probable in accordance with the conditional probability.

What is the difference between derivational and ontological unification?

Derivational unification is a matter of deriving large classes of explanandum sentences from a parsimonious set of premises, theoretical structures or inferential patterns. Ontological unification instead is a matter of redescribing a large number of apparently independent phenomena as forms or manifestations of a common system of entities, capacities, or causes, thus revealing an underlying ontic unity between apparently diverse phenomena. Kitcher's account is a variant of derivational unification, for it is an explicit attempt to cash out a notion of unification detached from the metaphysics of causation. Mäki [2001] however points out that although in some cases all that unification amounts to is derivation, in many cases derivational and ontological unification can go together. A theory might be conceived as unifying in virtue of unraveling the real unity among the phenomena, which is achieved by way of applying the same pattern of derivation to the explanation of diverse phenomena. In particular, Mäki [2001] provides some evidence that in economics unification often manifests itself as derivational unification with ontological grounding. The idea of a derivational unification with ontological grounding comes close to Salmon's suggestion [1984] that the causal-mechanical and the unification views of explanation can be reconciled if scientific unity is seen as a product of delineating “pervasive causal mechanisms.” 6Skipper [1999] expands on Salmon's suggestion and proposes that on a causal-mechanical view of explanation, explanations that unify empirical phenomena proceed via the application of schematized causal mechanisms, what he calls “mechanism schema”.

What is the unification of GeoEcon?

The GeoEcon unification is not a matter of reducing one type of phenomena to another for say cities are not shown to be one and the same as industry clus-ters. What binds the phenomena together and permits their treatment under a unified framework is the presence of a set of common causal mechanisms, and the kind of unity at the level of the phenomena that GeoEcon entails is therefore one of interconnectedness. The unification of phenomena is not just a derivational achievement: GeoEcon applies the same mechanism schemata over and over again to explain diverse agglomeration phenomena, and by so doing it hopes to capture the ontic interconnectedness that binds these phenomena together.

How to explain an individual fact?

An individual fact is said to be explained by pointing out its cause, that is, by stating the law or laws of causation, of which its production is an instance [ 1974 ].

What are the two distinctions that are important to understand about the unification of Geoecon?

To address the first question I introduce two distinctions, which will help to characterize the kind of unification GeoEcon pursues and what it entails regarding unity among the phenomena . The first is Uskali Mäki's distinction between explanatory unification of the derivational kind and explanatory unification of the ontological kind [1990; 2001], and the second is Margaret Morrison's distinction between synthetic and reductive unification.

Why is clinical diagnostics important?

In accord with this traditional dogma, clinical diagnostics is supposed to provide explanations of the patient's suffering. It is therefore important to ask what an explanation is and whether it is true that clinical diagnostics provides explanations of the patient's suffering.

What is a D-N explanation?

A D-N explanation is a deductive argument such that the explanandum statement follows from the explanans. The explanans consists of m ≥ 1 universal generalizations, referred to as laws, and n ≥ 1 statements of antecedent conditions. The explanandum statement describes an event such as, for example, the event that the patient Hilary has suffered myocardial infarction. A D-N argument may be schematically represented in the following way:

What is the most important theory of scientific explanation?

The most influential theory of scientific explanation today, first proposed by Carl Gustav Hempel and Paul Oppenheim in 1948 [ Hempel and Oppenheim 1948; Hempel, 1965 ], is known as the “covering-law model.” Roughly, it says that a scientific explanation is a logical argument whose premises comprise a set of statements that include one or more scientific laws and whose conclusion is a statement that describes the explanandum, i.e. the phenomenon, fact or event to be explained. The premises are called the explanans because they explain the explanandum. In addition to laws the explanans also contains some other statements describing those particular circumstances, called antecedent conditions, which made the occurrence of explanandum possible.

What is the D-N theory?

It provides an explication of the so-called hypothetico-deductive approach where the laws in the explanans represent the hypotheses. The idea behind it is that a D-N argument explains an event by demonstrating that this event was nomically expectable (“nomos” ≡ law ). An extensive analysis, criticism, and evaluation of the theory may be found in [ Stegmüller, 1983 ].

What does Hampel believe about the sufficiency of the empirical conditions of adequacy?

These conditions are as following. The sentences constituting the explanans must be true or the explanans have to be highly confirmed by all the relevant evidence available rather than that they should be true. Probably, thist means that explanans statements should be supported empirically. We discussed already that support by facts is a necessary but not sufficient condition for assertion that a proposition is ‘true’.

What is the A2 in Hilary's heart?

A2 A main coronary artery of Hilary's heart occluded at time t1 (e.g. ten minutes ago);

How to explain an individual fact?

An individual fact is said to be explained by pointing out its cause, that is, by stating the law or laws of causation, of which its production is an instance [ 1974 ].

Why is clinical diagnostics important?

In accord with this traditional dogma, clinical diagnostics is supposed to provide explanations of the patient's suffering. It is therefore important to ask what an explanation is and whether it is true that clinical diagnostics provides explanations of the patient's suffering.

In scientific method

Carl Gustav Hempel and Paul Oppenheim (1948), in their deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation, motivated the distinction between explanans and explanandum in order to answer why-questions, rather than simply what-questions:

Other examples

Constitutum -- that which gets made up, constituted, e.g. a legal constitution. Constituens -- that which makes it up, e.g. the constituents who are authorized to make a constitution.

Overview

An explanandum (a Latin term) is a sentence describing a phenomenon that is to be explained, and the explanans are the sentences adduced as explanations of that phenomenon. For example, one person may pose an explanandum by asking "Why is there smoke?", and another may provide an explanans by responding "Because there is a fire". In this example, "smoke" is the explanandum, and "fire" is the explanans.

In scientific method

In biological systematics

In the social sciences

Related terms