Professor Sterba argues for two interesting and provocative positions regarding affirmative action. First, affirmative action programs are still needed to ensure diversity in educational institutions of higher learning. Secondly, the proponents and opponents of affirmative action are not as far apart as they seem to think.
Throughout Sterba’s book, we find examples of how the objections to affirmative action are not solely about equality of opportunity or diversity or qualifications, these objections seem to turn on the persons who are expected to be the beneficiaries of these programs, namely, black folks.
In a provocative way, Sterba’s book is a potent reminder of this perhaps sad fact: Racism, sexism, and classism are deeply rooted in the social and moral fibers of the US. Affirmative action can help give those members of groups that otherwise would not have equal opportunity to secure employment or educational benefits.
In contrast, Sterba rejects the strict-scrutiny standard for benign affirmative action and argues that there are several Constitutionally compelling interests, namely compensation for past injuries, educational diversity (including role models), and provision of services to minorities.
He argues that diversity has significantly good effects such as improving the overall educational performance and promoting services to minority communities.
Sterba repeatedly focuses on the claim that blacks and other minorities have been harmed in the recent past and present. This allows him to avoid the objection that injustices in the distant past caused the existence of current blacks and other minorities and hence cannot ground a compensatory claim.
Cohen argues race preferences are not justified as compensation for past injustice. He argues that these programs place the burden on compensation unjustly on parties such as current white males who have performed no injustices (pp. 33-37). He also argues that these programs distribute the compensatory benefits unjustly in several ways. First, the programs give benefits to individuals who have not been unjustly injured merely on account of their race (pp. 27-29). Second, the programs fail to give benefits to non-minorities who have been unjustly injured by bad schools and poverty (pp. 29-33). Third, the programs fail to give benefits out in a way that is proportionate to the degree of injury since they help the most well-off minorities (p. 31).
Cohen argues that precedent supports the notion that all racial classification must pass strict scrutiny, i.e., the government must have a compelling interest in the classification and the classification must be a narrowly tailored means by which to promote that interest.
Sterba’s idea is that we need to use racial classifications and preferences in order to enforce or correct for violations of the Act. He argues that given that the Act allows for racial classification and preferences, the real issue is over how extensive that use should be.
Gurin argues that the racial and ethnic composition of a student body correlates positively with classroom diversity, informal discussions of race, and interracial friendships.