The Sinai t 1400 hours on 6 October 1973 the Arabs launched a surprise two-front assault on the Israelis under the codename of Operation Badr. Egyptian and Syrian armour swept all before them and t…
The Intelligence Failure of the Yom Kippur War of 1973 . Stephen Spinder. Shippensburg University (Shippensburg, Pennsylvania) On the morning of 6 October 1973, the inexperienced young reservists of the Israel Defense Force (IDF) stationed on the Bar-Lev Line in the Sinai Peninsula received the order to mobilize in light of a possible Egyptian assault.
The Yom Kippur War of 1973, the most recent ‘full’ war in Middle East history, is so-called because it began on the Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur), the holiest day of prayer and fasting in the Jewish calendar.The Yom Kippur War is also known as the October War. At the time of Yom Kippur, Israel was led by Golda Meir and Egypt by Anwar Sadat.
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War was a watershed for U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East. It forced the Nixon administration to realize that Arab frustration over Israel’s unwillingness to withdraw from the territories it had occupied in 1967 could have major strategic consequences for the United States.
In September of 1973 Egypt's strategic situation appeared as bleak as at any point in the post-world War II era. Six years earlier Egypt, in alliance with Jordan and Syria, had suffered a military defeat of catastrophic proportions at the hands of Israel.
Israel also gained control of Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. Entering the fall of 1973 Egypt's strategic position appeared extremely tenuous. The Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, had failed to achieve the strategic goals of the Arab coalition and his leadership within the Arab world was threatened. Further, the demands of the 1967 Khartoum Conference appeared to eliminate any alternative course of action. The Egyptian leadership faced the dilemma of how to break the deadlock in which it was entangled with Israel without alienating itself from the Arab mainstream. President Sadat, under intense pressure both internally and throughout the Middle East, had to construct a strategic plan in order to engage Israel and recoup the losses of 1967...and survive (politically and literally) long enough to witness the results.
Even as mortal combat continued on the Sinai, Sadat emerged as the leader of the Arab world and in a position of strength to negotiate with Israel. Again, Time Magazine accurately reflected the new situation in the Middle East:
The IAF lost over 50 aircraft in the first 3 days of the conflict (approximately one-fourth of its total strength)34, and would lose over 100 throughout the full course of the war. Almost every combat loss was incurred by the SAM umbrellas which covered both the Egyptian and Syrian offensives. While Israeli air operations would eventually gain the upper hand, the IDF's air arm was never able to inflict the kind of punishment which characterized the Six Day War.
The IAF lost over 50 aircraft in the first 3 days of the conflict (approximately one-fourth of its total strength)34, and would lose over 100 throughout the full course of the war. Almost every combat loss was incurred by the SAM umbrellas which covered both the Egyptian and Syrian offensives.
Syria relinquished the strategic Golan Heights, Jordan lost both the West Bank of the Jordan River and Jerusalem. Egypt, the leader of the Arab coalition, paid for its miscalculated aggression with the loss of the Sinai desert and the Suez Canal.
By dusk on 8 June the IDF forces had crushed 7 Egyptian divisions (5 Infantry and 2 Armored) and controlled the entire Sinai. Additionally, Israel took advantage of Jordanian artillery assaults to launch a second front, and soon controlled both the entire West Bank and, most critically, Jerusalem.