Philip Ho Hwang What is Mencius' theory of human nature? Much has been written on the question of whether Mencius' theory of human nature is a sound theory; how Mencius tries, if at all, to justify his theory;
Mencius (1875). “The Life and Works of Mencius: With Essays and Notes”, p.380, Digireads.com Publishing
Mencius or Mengzi (372–289 BC or 385–303 or 302BC) was a Chinese Confucian philosopher who has often been described as the “second Sage“, that is after only Confucius himself. Living during the Warring States period, he is said to have spent much of his life travelling around China offering counsel to different rulers.
Mencius (孟子) was an important Confucian teacher. Information on Mencius including his personal life, political Philosophy and more.
The text of the Mencius claims to record Mencius’ teachings to his disciples as well as his dialogues with the philosophers and rulers of his day. 2. The Mencius of the Text. Mencius inherits from Confucius a set of terms and a series of problems.
The two best known early interpreters of Mencius’ thought – besides the compilers of the Mencius themselves – are the Warring States philosophers Gaozi (Kao-tzu, 300s BCE) and Xunzi (Hsun-tzu, 310-220 BCE). Gaozi, who is known only from the Mencius, evidently knew Mencius personally, but Xunzi knew him only retrospectively.
Mencius thus shares with Confucius three assumptions about Tian as an extrahuman, absolute power in the universe: (1) its alignment with moral goodness, (2) its dependence on human agents to actualize its will, and (3) the variable, unpredictable nature of its associations with mortal actors.
In other words, Wu was morally justified in executing Zhou, because Zhou had proven himself to be unworthy of the throne through his offenses against ren and yi – the very qualities associated with the Confucian exemplar ( junzi) and his actions. This is an example of Mencius engaging in the “rectification of names” ( zhengming ), an exercise that Confucius considered to be prior to all other philosophical activity ( Analects 13.3).
Like the historical Confucius, the historical Mencius is available only through a text that, in its complete form at least, postdates his traditional lifetime (372-289 BCE). The philological controversy surrounding the date and composition of the text that bears his name is far less intense than that which surrounds the Confucian Analects, however. Most scholars agree that the entire Mencius was assembled by Mencius himself and his immediate disciples, perhaps shortly after his death. The text records several encounters with various rulers during Mencius’ old age, which can be dated between 323 and 314 BCE, making Mencius an active figure no later than the late fourth century BCE.
The common intellectual and political problem that Warring States thinkers hoped to solve was the problem of China’s unification.
Here, Mencius reveals his antipathy for – and competition with – philosophers who followed Mozi, a fifth-century BCE contemporary of Confucius who propounded a utilitarian theory of value based on li (benefit):
5. Hobbes and Rousseau on Moral Education. As it happens, Rousseau wrote extensively about moral education in Emile, a story of the idealized education of a boy from birth to adulthood. Hobbes also makes a number of remarks about moral education in the Leviathan.
We can get a better hold of the conflict between Mencius and Xunzi on this point by looking at the different metaphors they use for moral development. Mencius repeatedly compares moral development to the cultivation or growth of a sprout. [23] Xunzi compares moral development to straightening a board or sharpening metal. [24] These metaphors can be made to do a lot of work for both authors. [25]
Rousseau and Mencius diverge, however, in important ways. Where Mencius assumes a child always fully embedded in society, Rousseau takes great pains to shield Emile from most of society – so much so that in early adolescence Rousseau can say that
In Chapters 1 and 2, Xunzi attempts to inspire the reader toward further moral development. He thus seems implicitly to hope that the reader has the desire to improve himself, or can be inspired to that desire; and this may seem to conflict with the picture of moral development just described, on which morality has to be forced from outside. The resolution of this difficulty, I believe, is to read Xunzi here as speaking principally to people who already have come some considerable distance in their development – to the point, perhaps, where their inclinations have some moral merit and they can see the value in further moral development. Adapting the metaphor, one might imagine that Xunzi’s wood, after having been straightened to a considerable extent, can itself contribute to the final part of the straightening process. For the young and the vicious, however, we may still interpret Xunzi as preferring rote conformity (“reciting the classics” [28] ) and compulsion; real understanding comes only near the end. [29]
Hobbes famously writes in the Leviathan that the “naturall condition of mankind” – his condition prior to establishment of the state – is one of misery and “Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man” and life is “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short”. [1] .
If Hobbes’s and Rousseau’s aim in conducting this thought experiment is to begin an inquiry into the value (or disvalue) of society and government, it may have some purpose; but it would be less misleading to call the conditions they imagine “governmentless” or “societyless” than “natural”.
The famous claims about “human nature” in the Leviathan and the Discourse on Inequality appear to pertain, as I have said, to how human beings would behave without government or stable social structures. But it is, in a way, very strange to suppose that our behavior absent social structures is our natural behavior.
Stage 1 (Obedience and Punishment ): The earliest stages of moral development, obedience and punishment are especially common in young children, but adults are also capable of expressing this type of reasoning. According to Kohlberg, people at this stage see rules as fixed and absolute. 7 Obeying the rules is important because it is a way to avoid punishment.
Level 1. Preconventional Morality. Preconventional morality is the earliest period of moral development.
How do people develop morality? This question has fascinated parents, religious leaders, and philosophers for ages, but moral development has also become a hot-button issue in psychology and education. 1 Do parental or societal influences play a greater role in moral development? Do all kids develop morality in similar ways?
Kohlberg's theory is broken down into three primary levels. At each level of moral development, there are two stages. Similar to how Piaget believed that not all people reach the highest levels of cognitive development, Kohlberg believed not everyone progresses to the highest stages of moral development.
3 Kohlberg extended Piaget's theory, proposing that moral development is a continual process that occurs throughout the lifespan. His theory outlines six stages of moral development within three different levels.
Stage 6 (Universal Principles): Kohlberg’s final level of moral reasoning is based on universal ethical principles and abstract reasoning. At this stage, people follow these internalized principles of justice, even if they conflict with laws and rules.
Kohlberg's theory played an important role in the development of moral psychology. While the theory has been highly influential, aspects of the theory have been critiqued for a number of reasons:
The text of the Mencius claims to record Mencius’ teachings to his disciples as well as his dialogues with the philosophers and rulers of his day. 2. The Mencius of the Text. Mencius inherits from Confucius a set of terms and a series of problems.
The two best known early interpreters of Mencius’ thought – besides the compilers of the Mencius themselves – are the Warring States philosophers Gaozi (Kao-tzu, 300s BCE) and Xunzi (Hsun-tzu, 310-220 BCE). Gaozi, who is known only from the Mencius, evidently knew Mencius personally, but Xunzi knew him only retrospectively.
Mencius thus shares with Confucius three assumptions about Tian as an extrahuman, absolute power in the universe: (1) its alignment with moral goodness, (2) its dependence on human agents to actualize its will, and (3) the variable, unpredictable nature of its associations with mortal actors.
In other words, Wu was morally justified in executing Zhou, because Zhou had proven himself to be unworthy of the throne through his offenses against ren and yi – the very qualities associated with the Confucian exemplar ( junzi) and his actions. This is an example of Mencius engaging in the “rectification of names” ( zhengming ), an exercise that Confucius considered to be prior to all other philosophical activity ( Analects 13.3).
Like the historical Confucius, the historical Mencius is available only through a text that, in its complete form at least, postdates his traditional lifetime (372-289 BCE). The philological controversy surrounding the date and composition of the text that bears his name is far less intense than that which surrounds the Confucian Analects, however. Most scholars agree that the entire Mencius was assembled by Mencius himself and his immediate disciples, perhaps shortly after his death. The text records several encounters with various rulers during Mencius’ old age, which can be dated between 323 and 314 BCE, making Mencius an active figure no later than the late fourth century BCE.
The common intellectual and political problem that Warring States thinkers hoped to solve was the problem of China’s unification.
Here, Mencius reveals his antipathy for – and competition with – philosophers who followed Mozi, a fifth-century BCE contemporary of Confucius who propounded a utilitarian theory of value based on li (benefit):